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Mackey: Playboy Enterprises, Inc., v. Netscape Communications Corp.: The

PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES, INC., V. NETSCAPE
COMMUNICATIONS CORP.: THE LEGAL
WORLD'S FIRST STEP IN DETERMINING
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND DILUTION
IN BANNER ADVERTISING ON THE INTERNET

I. INTRODUCTION
On June 24, 1999, the United States District Court, Central
District of California, decided Playboy Enterprises, Inc., v.
Netscape Communications Corp., a case that may have a
substantial impact on how trademark law is applied to advertising
on the Internet. 2 By ruling in favor of the defendants Netscape
Communications Corp. ("Netscape") and Excite, Inc. ("Excite"),
the court claimed that Netscape and Excite did not infringe upon
Enterprises Inc.'s ("PEI") most popular
two of Playboy
3
trademarks.
PEI, a publisher of adult entertainment, sued Netscape and
Excite claiming that Netscape's and Excite's use of the trademarks
"Playboy" and "Playmate" in their website search engines was4
trademark dilution.
federal trademark infringement and federal
On April 15, 1999, PEI filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction
in an attempt to bar Netscape and Excite from using its marks in
their search engines. 5 The court denied PEI's motion for
injunctive relief for four reasons. First, PEI failed to establish that6
commerce.
Netscape and Excite used the marks in interstate
Second, PEI failed to show that Netscape's and Excite's use of the
7
Third the court
marks created a likelihood of confusion.
1 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F.
Supp.2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
2 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1070.
3 Id. at 1070.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 1072.
6 Id. at 1070.
7 Id.
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determined that PEI had failed to prove that actual trademark
dilution had occurred. 8 Finally, the court also determined that the
First Amendment and the fair use9 doctrine protected Netscape's
and Excite's use of the trademarks.
Although the Internet involves highly technical matter, courts
continue to use the well-established legal principles of federal and
state trademark law.' 0 Nevertheless, Internet advertising has
significantly increased the likelihood of confusion by distorting the
lines between various communications media.11 One reason
Internet advertising has created new problems in trademark law is
because the Internet is available to an unlimited number of
individuals and businesses. 12 Where before most individuals and
businesses acted as listeners or viewers, the Internet has allowed
these parties to act as advertisers of their own products and
services to millions of people. 13 The Internet also makes it easier
for unethical parties to use famous trademarks to their own
advantage. 14 These new issues, as well as others, have led to
numerous problems for the courts.
In Playboy v. Netscape, the court acknowledged the difficulty of
applying well-established trademark law to the Internet and5
recognized that Internet law is a quickly expanding body of law.'
Nevertheless, the court's decision in Playboy v. Netscape plays an
integral part in establishing how courts will decide cases
concerning trademark use in Internet advertising.
This case note will review the facts of Playboy v. Netscape, the
arguments presented by PEI, the application of well-established
trademark law to Internet advertising, and a comment on the
court's decision.
8 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1070.

9 Id.
10 3 George E. Rosden, & Peter E. Rosden, THE LAW OF ADVERTISING, §
56.03 (2000).
11 Id.
12 2 Jerome Gilson et al., TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, §
5.11[1] (2000).
13 Id.

14 Id.
15 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1073.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. Background of PEI,Netscapeand Excite
PEI is a leading publisher of adult entertainment and uses the
"Playboy" and "Playmate" trademarks in association with
numerous products and services. 6 PEI registered the "Playboy"
mark on December 28, 1954, in connection with its monthly adult
entertainment magazine and registered the "Playmate" mark on
its calendars.1 7 The marks
September 26, 1961, in connection with
8
are also registered in several states.'
Since registration, PEI has expanded the uses of the "Playboy"
19
and "Playmate" marks to numerous other products and services.
Several examples of its expanded use are "Playboy Presents:
Video Playmates," "Playboy's Playmate Review," and "Playboy's
Playmates of the Year.",20 The marks have also been used in such
services as cable television, videocassettes, CD-ROMS, the
"Playboy Catalog," and www.playboy.com. 2 1

Netscape and Excite own websites on the World Wide Web.22
Both websites, called search engines, allow users the ability to
Search engines play an
search the Internet for information.
integral role for the Internet because they help users locate desired
information rather easily. 24 Without search engines, users would

16 Id. at 1076.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1076.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1077.
23 Id. In deciding this case, the court noted that Netscape's search engine is
co-branded with and programmed by Excite. Nevertheless, the court treated
both Netscape and Excite as search engine operators.
24 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1077.
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be lost in the vast world of cyberspace and would be unable to
easily locate a desired website
A search engine allows a user to search the Internet for a
particular topic by allowing the user to enter several related
words.26 Once the words are entered, the search engine matches
website. 27
the words entered by the user with words found in a
The search engine then compiles a list of websites that include the
words that were typed in by the user. 28 The list of websites is then
presented to the user on a search result page. 29 Some search
engines not only look at words presented in a domain name and
text of a website, but also at words implanted in a website's
software code. 30 Although these words are invisible to an Internet
with
user, a search engine can locate such words and match them 32
3 1 These invisible words are called meta-tags.
the user's query.
When a search result page is presented to the user, the page will
include the listing of search results, recommended websites, and
one or more banner ads.3 3 A banner ad is an advertisement,
usually found at the top of a web page, used by advertisers to sell
products and lure users to the their websites. 34 Usually a banner ad
acts as a link to the advertisers' website. 35 The link allows the
the banner ad and be brought directly to
user to click his mouse on
36
website.
the advertiser's

25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1077.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. For example, a search engine user may enter the term "baseball rules"
in effort to find information on the rules of baseball. When the search engine
conducts its search and presents a search result page, the page may include a
listing for the Chicago Cubs baseball team's website because the Chicago Cubs'
website has the word "baseball" embedded in its software as a meta-tag.
33 Id. at 1077.
34 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1077-1078.
35 Id. at 1078.
36Id.
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Search engine operators such as Netscape and Excite can
program their servers to present banner ads on a search result page
in several ways. The banner ads can be randomly posted, posted
in a particular order, or triggered by "key" search terms. 37 By
using key search terms, search engine operators program their
servers to post a particular banner ad whenever a search engine
user enters a certain word or words. 38 For example, an operator
can program their search result page to post a banner ad
advertising "www.espn.com" whenever a user types the word
"baseball" into the search engine. Using key search terms allows
a
an advertiser to enhance the effectiveness of its ad by targeting
39
public.
purchasing
the
within
profile
particular demographic
When a banner ad appears on a search result page, the user
cannot determine whether the ad appeared through a random
posting or because a key search term was entered. 40 The
appearance of the banner ad is the same no matter how it was
posted on the search result page. 4 1 There is no message or mark
on the banner ad informing the user that the42ad was triggered by
the terms they entered into the search engine.

B. History of the Case
In May 1998, Netscape and Excite began selling a package
consisting of over 450 adult entertainment terms to adult
entertainment advertisers. 43 Whenever an Internet user entered
one of the 450 terms into either Netscape's or Excite's search
engine, a banner ad from one of the advertisers who purchased the
package would appear.44 Since there were numerous advertisers
who purchased the package, Netscape and Excite posted the ads
37 Id.

38 Id.
39 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1072.
40 Id. at 1078.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1078.
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from the advertisers in a pre-determined rotation. 45 The advertiser
then paid Netscape and Excite for each time their banner ad was
posted.46 The user did not have to click on the banner ad's link for
Netscape and Excite to receive their income, only the posting of
the ad was required.47
Included in the package of 450 terms were PEI's marks
"Playboy" and "Playmate." 48 Whenever a Netscape or Excite
search engine user entered the term "playboy" or "playmate," a
banner ad would appear on the search result page from one of the
advertisers who purchased the package. 49 The words "playboy" or
"playmate" would not appear in the banner ad, nor did the
advertisements claim that the ad was endorsed by or affiliated with
PEI.5 0 Nevertheless, PEI claimed that Netscape's and Excite's use
of "playboy" and "playmate" in the package infringed PEI's
trademark rights. 5

C. TrademarkInfringement
The federal government grants trademark protection through the
Lanham Act. 52 Trademark infringement occurs when a person,
without the registrant's consent, uses a "reproduction, counterfeit,
53
copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark" in commerce.
In order to establish trademark infringement, the plaintiff must be
able to establish that the defendant's use of its trademark54 is
causing a likelihood of confusion as to the source of a product.
The Ninth Circuit uses a variety of tests to determine the
likelihood of confusion because it never declared that one specific
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1078.
49 Id. at 1072.
50 Id. at 1078.
51 Id. at 1072.
52 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1999).

53 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1)(a) (1999).
54 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1074.
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test solely be used.55 Nevertheless, the most common test used by
the Ninth Circuit to determine a likelihood of confusion is an
eight-factor test.56 The eight factors, also known as the "Sleekcraft
Factors," used to determine a likelihood of confusion are the
following: 1) strength of the plaintiffs mark; 2) proximity of the
goods; 3) similarity of the marks; 4) actual confusion; 5) similarity
of the marketing channels; 6) degree of care used by the consumer;
7) defendant's intent to cause confusion; and 8) likelihood that
plaintiff will expand its product line.57 In applying the eight
factors, courts will consider some factors more important than
others; the weight of each factor will depend on the facts of each
specific case.58

D. TrademarkDilution
Trademark dilution, defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1127, is the
lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services. 59 Like trademark infringement,
trademark dilution must also occur in commerce. 60 The circuit
courts vary on how they interpret trademark dilution. Some circuit
courts only require a likelihood of dilution to establish trademark
dilution while other circuit courts require actual dilution. In the
Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff is required to prove actual dilution of
his mark in order for a court to find trademark dilution. 61 To
55 90 David J. Kera, & Theodore H. Davis, Jr., THE TRADEMARK REPORTER
108 (2000).
56 Id.
57 Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1163
(C.D. Cal. 1998). The "Sleekcraft Factors" are quite similar to the "Polaroid
Factors," which are used by many courts. Both include eight different factors,
but only seven of the factors are the same. Courts using the "Sleekcraft Factors"
examine the similarity of the marketing channels used by both parties of the
suit, whereas courts using the "Polaroid Factors" do not. Instead, courts using
the "Polaroid Factors" examine the quality of the defendant's product.
58 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1085.
59 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1999).
60 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1088.
61 Id.
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62
establish actual dilution, the plaintiff must prove two factors.
First, that the defendant used a trademark significantly similar to
the plaintiffs mark thereby leading consumers to believe the two
marks are related.63 Second, that the defendant's use of the mark
caused actual economic harm to the
plaintiffs famous mark by
64
power.
selling
mark's
lessening the
In the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff can establish the elements of
dilution by showing either a blurring or tarnishment of the mark.65
Blurring occurs when a defendant uses the plaintiffs mark to
identify the defendant's goods or services. 66 Blurring lessens the
67
mark's ability to identify and distinguish the plaintiffs product.
Tarnishment occurs when a famous mark
is incorrectly associated
68
with an inferior or offensive product.

III. FACTS
PEI argued that there were three separate instances where
Netscape's and Excite's use of "playboy" and "playmate"
constituted trademark infringement and trademark dilution. First,
PEI stated that the marketing and selling of the over 450-word
package with the terms "playboy" and "playmate" to Internet
advertisers was infringement. 69
Second, PEI claimed that
programming particular banner ads to post whenever the terms
"playboy" and "playmate" were entered into Netscape's and
Excite's search engines was also infringement. 70 Finally, PEI

62 Id.
63 Id.

64 Id.
65 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1088. The court does state that the elements of
dilution can be established even when there is no blurring or tarnishment. The
court, however, does not analyze the case for dilution outside the commonly
used areas blurring and tarnishment.
66 Id. at 1088.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1089.
69 Id. at 1073.
70 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1073.
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ads on search result pages
argued that the displaying of the banner
71
infringement.
trademark
constituted
PEI argued that Netscape's and Excite's use of the marks
diverted Internet users from PEI's website and from other websites
sponsored or approved by PEI.72 PEI's logic is that a user who
uses "playboy" or "playm ate" as a search term will not go to the
websites posted on the search result page, but instead will go
directly to the website advertised on the banner ad.73 PEI also
intended to divert users away
claimed that Netscape and Excite
74
from PEI endorsed websites.
PEI centered its trademark infringement claim on a concept
called "initial interest confusion." 75 Initial interest confusion is a
form of confusion generally used by the Ninth Circuit for
Initial interest
trademark cases concerning the Internet. 76
confusion occurs when an Internet user uses a trademark to
conduct a search and the results include websites not affiliated
with the owner of the trademark.77 The user experiences initial
interest confusion because they wrongly assume that the websites
that appear on the search result pages are affiliated with the owner
of the trademark. 78 The user may then be diverted to a website not
affiliated with the trademark owner. 79 Usually the user will
eventually realize that the website they went to is not affiliated
with the trademark owner. 80 Nevertheless, the user may decide to
stay on the website rather than go to the one they initially
wanted. 81 The Ninth Circuit acknowledges this practice as
has been
trademark infringement because a potential customer
82
website.
owner's
trademark
the
from
away
taken
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1074.
Id.
Id.

78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1074.

81 Id.
82 Id.
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In a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit recognized initial interest
confusion when a non-owner of a trademark used the trademark in
a meta-tag. 83 At first glance, it would appear that the use of a
mark in one's meta-tag does not create a likelihood of confusion
84
because the mark in the meta-tag is hidden from the user's view.
Additionally, the user may realize, through the information given
by the listing on the search result page, that the website is not
affiliated with the mark's owner. 85 Nevertheless, courts in the
Ninth Circuit have found the use of a trademark in one's meta-tag
as trademark infiingement
as long as the mark is not a common
86
word.
English
An example of a court's use of initial interest confusion is found
in Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment
Corp.87
In Brookefield, Brookefield Communications
("Brookefield"), an entertainment-industry information provider
with the registered trademark "Movie Buff," sued West Coast
Entertainment ("West Coast") because West Coast had begun use
because
of the Internet domain name www.moviebuff.com and
88
West Coast used the term "moviebuff' in its meta-tags.
In ruling in favor of Brookefield, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that West Coast's use of
the term "moviebuff' in its domain name and in its meta-tags
constituted trademark infringement. 89 The most significant part of
this decision was the court's finding that West Coast's use of
90
"moviebuff' in its meta-tags created initial interest confusion.
83 Brookefield Communications, Inc., v. West Coast Entertainment
Corporation, 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999).
84 Rosden, supranote 8, § 56.03[3].
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Brookefield, 174 F.3d at 1062.
88 Id. at 1064. The court stated that the use of a plaintiff's trademark in the
defendant's meta-tags is similar to placing a sign with the plaintiffs trademark
in front of the defendant's store. The initial interest confusion will initially get
the confused customer into the store. Once the customer realizes that they are
not in the store they thought they were entering into, the customer may decide to
stay in the store because the same products or services are being sold.
89 Id. at 1061.
90 Id. at 1062.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol11/iss1/6

10

Mackey: Playboy Enterprises, Inc., v. Netscape Communications Corp.: The

PLAYBOY V NETSCAPE

2001]

The court found initial interest confusion because it felt that an
Internet user looking for Brookefield's "MovieBuff' products
might stay at West Coast's website if taken there by a search
engine. 91 The court reasoned that because it is very easy for an
Internet user to enter a website, users are more likely to be
confused as to the ownership or affiliation of a website than a
conventional customer would be confused of a physical store's
ownership.

92

IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS AND DECISION
In its analysis, the court in Playboy v. Netscape gave several
reasons for denying PEI's injunction motion.93 First, the court
determined that PEI failed to establish that Netscape and Excite
used "playboy" and "playmate" in commerce. 94 Second, the court
determined that PEI failed to show that Netscape's and Excite's
use of the terms created a likelihood of confusion. 95 Third, the
court found that PEI was unable to prove actual trademark
dilution. 96 Finally, the court found that the First Amendment and
the fair use doctrine protected Netscape's and Excite's use of the
terms.

97

In reaching its decision, the court placed most of its
concentration on the nature of the words "playboy" and
"playmate."
The court did not get involved in a detailed
traditional analysis of trademark law, specifically the eight-factor
test 98 for likelihood of confusion. Additionally, the court did not
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1057.
93 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1070.

94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Bally, 29 F. Supp.2d at 1163. The eight factors used to determine a
likelihood of confusion are: 1) strength of the plaintiffs mark; 2) proximity of
the goods; 3) similarity of the marks; 4) actual confusion; 5) similarity of the

marketing channels; 6) degree of care used by the consumer; 7) defendant's

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

11

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6

DEPAUL J. ART. & ENT. LAW

[Vol. XI: 157

get into a detailed discussion of initial interest confusion even
99
though initial interest confusion was the crux of PEI's argument.
Instead, the court chose to analyze the manner in which Netscape
and Excite used the marks and the manner in which Internet users
were using the marks. 00 The court felt that the use of "playboy"
and "playmate," as common English
words rather than trademark
10 1
case.
the
in
issue
key
the
was
terms,

A. PEI's Failureto Establish Use in Commerce
The focal point of the court's analysis was the manner in which
Netscape and Excite used the terms "playboy" and "playmate."
The threshold issue in determining whether a mark has been
10 2
infringed or diluted is whether the mark was used in commerce.
A plaintiff will lose a trademark infiingement and dilution claim if
he is unable to show that defendant used the registered mark in a
commercial setting.
PEI claimed that Netscape and Excite used the marks "Playboy"
and "Playmate" in commerce when the marks were sold as search
terms in the 450-word adult entertainment package. 103 The court
felt that this claim was not accurate because Netscape and Excite
used the terms "playboy" and "playmate" as words, not
trademarks. 10 4 The court stated that for PEI to properly claim that
its "Playboy" and "Playmate" marks were used, it would have to
show that the marks "Playboy@" and "Playmate®" were sold as
search terms in the 450-word package. 10 5 The court determined
that the use of "Playboy" and "Playmate" without the "®" was not
enough because the words themselves are not being used to
intent to cause confusion; and 8) likelihood that plaintiff will expand their
product its product line.
99 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1074-1075.
100 Id. at 1078.
101 Id. at 1081.
102 Id. at 1073.
103 Id.
104 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1082.
105 Id.
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"identify the source of any goods or services."' 6 This finding by
the court created a large obstacle for PEI because an Internet user
10 7
cannot conduct a search using the trademark form of a word.
An Internet user is required to enter a search0 8term in its generic
form in order to get a valid search result page.1
The inability of PEI to claim the use of its trademarks
"Playboy®" and "Playmate®" led the court to analyze the case
through a different perspective. The court looked at Netscape's
and Excite's use of the terms "playboy" and "playmate" as uses of
common English words.' 0 9 The court reasoned that Netscape and
Excite were not using "playboy" or "playmate" to identify the
source of any goods or services; they were just using them as
generic words. 110 This perspective damaged PEI's case because
PEI argued that Netscape and Excite used the marks to trigger
banner ads for adult entertainment websites competing against
PEI."' The court felt otherwise and ruled that Netscape and
Excite did not use "playboy" and "playmate" in their trademark
capacity and therefore not in commerce. 112
The court used several analogous Ninth Circuit decisions to
support its ruling. In Brookefield, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit ruled that even though Brookefield could bar West
Coast from using the domain name www.moviebuff.com and the
term "moviebuff' in its meta-tags, Brookefield could not bar West
Coast from using the term "movie buff'(with space between the
words). 1 3 The Court of Appeals noted that West Coast could use
the term "movie buff' (with space) in its website because it is a
descriptive word commonly used to describe an avid motion
picture fan.114

106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Playboy, 55 F.Supp.2d at 1082.
110 Id.
111 Id.at 1073.
112 Id.
113 Brookefield, 164 F.3d at 1066.
114 Id.
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The court also used Playboy Enterprises,Inc., v. Terri Welles,
Inc. to support its decision. In Playboy v. Welles, PEI sued Welles
for trademark infringement and dilution because she used the
of5
registered trademarks "Playmate of the Month" and "Playmate 11
www.terriwelles.com.
website,
the Year" in her personal
Welles, a former "Playmate of the Month" and "Playmate of the
Year," used the marks in headings for her website, in the title of
the website's link page, and in the website's meta-tags. 116 She also
used the abbreviation "PMOY" as a watermark in the background
of the website's pages. 117 The district court found no trademark
infringement because Welles' used the marks in her website for
non-trademark purposes. 118 The district court recognized that
Welles used the marks in a descriptive manner when she used
them to describe the goods and services of the website, as well as
herself.119

B. Limited PropertyRights of Trademarks
In reaching its decision, the court also expressed the limited
rights a trademark owner has over the marks they own.
Essentially, the court made it clear that owning a registered
trademark does not grant the mark owner a complete monopoly
over the words used in the mark. 120 The owner only has a limited
property right over the words or phrases used in a mark. 121 Unlike
patents 22and copyrights, trademarks are not "monopolistic
grants."1

115 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp.2d 1066, 1073

(S.D. Cal. 1999).
116 Playboy v. Welles, 78 F. Supp.2d at 1071-1072.

117 Id.
at 1078.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1080.

121 Id. at 1081.
122 Id.
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The court determined that PEI was not entitled to the entire
commercial use of the words "playboy" and "playmate." 123 PEI
argued that its lawsuit hinged on the fact that Netscape and Excite
used "playboy" and "playmate" in order to benefit from PEI's
highly regarded reputation. 124 PEI felt that Netscape and Excite
included the marks in the 450-word adult entertairment package to
purposely take advantage of the mark's popularity. 125 PEI also
argued that Netscape and Excite knew Internet users would use the
terms "playboy" and "playmate" when using their search engines
to look for adult entertainment websites. 126 PEI felt that with this
knowledge, Netscape and Excite intentionally used the marks
the
because it would increase the package's sales and increase
1 27
post.
would
ads
banner
entertainment
adult
times
amount of
Following Ninth Circuit precedent, the court rejected PEI's
argument that Netscape and Excite used PEI's well-recognized
reputation to enhance its revenue. 128 In past decisions, the Ninth
Circuit has limited trademark protection to a mark's source
identification function. 129 For public policy reasons, the Ninth
by non-owners in
Circuit has allowed registered marks to be used
30
economy.'
competitive
a
order to encourage
The court based its decision on two facts. First, although PEI
owned the marks "Playboy" and "Playmate," it could not limit the
use of the words when used as common English terms. 131 Outside
its trademark use, the terms "playboy" and "playmate" are
commonly used to refer to entities not related to PEI. Second, in
past decisions the Ninth Circuit has allowed defendants to use a
plaintiffs trademark without the plaintiffs consent. 132 The court
noted several decisions where the defendant was allowed to use
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1081.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Playboy,55 F. Supp.2d at 1081.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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the plaintiff's trademark for non-identifying purposes.133 For
example, in Playboy v. Welles, the court allowed former Playboy
Playmate Terri Welles the use of "Playboy" and "Playmate" in
advertising her website on the Internet.' 3 4 Additionally, in Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., the court allowed the defendant to
distribute the song "Barbie Girl" without Mattel's consent to use
the registered mark "Barbie."' 135 In Mattel, the court determined
that the defendant's use of Barbie" did not create a likelihood of
confusion and36that the song was a simple parody of the "Barbie"
fashion doll.1

C. FirstAmendment Protection
The court also determined that the First Amendment of the
Constitution outweighed PEI's right to protect the "Playboy" and
"Playmate" marks. 137 While a trademark owner does have a right
to protect its marks and challenge an infringing use of its mark, the
138
protection cannot violate the First Amendment rights of others.
The court used language from Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp.,
v. Faber, to support this finding. 39 In Bally, the defendant
maintained a website called "Bally Sucks." 140 The court in Bally
found no infringement because the defendant was using the mark
to criticize Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. 14' In agreeing with
the decision in Bally, the court in Playboy v. Netscape stated that,
"prohibiting [defendant] from using [plaintiffs] name in the

133 Id.
134 Playboy v. Welles, 78 F. Supp.2d at 1078.
135 Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp.2d 1120, 1139 (C.D. Cal.
1998).
136 Mattel, 28 F. Supp.2d at 1139.
137 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1084.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 1085.
140 Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1162.
141 Id.
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isolate him from all but
machine readable code would effectively
142
users."
Internet
of
the most savvy
In Playboy v. Netscape, PEI is attempting to prevent Netscape
and Excite from using the words "playboy" and "playmate" in
their adult entertainment package. 143 The court felt that allowing
such prevention would grant PEI a monopoly in the Internet over
the words "playboy" and "playmate." 144 The court decided that
violate the First Amendment rights of
such a monopoly would
14 5
parties.
three separate
First, Netscape's and Excite's First Amendment rights to free
speech would be violated because they would be prevented from
using the words "playboy" and "playmate" in their adult
entertainment package. 146 Second, other trademark owners of the
words "playboy" and "playmate" would have their First
Amendment rights violated because they would not be able to use
the words "playboy" and "playmate" as well. 147 For example, W.E.
Bailey & Son, Inc., the owner of the mark "The Louisiana
Playboy, ' 148 would have its rights violated because PEI would
have exclusive rights to the word "playboy" and would be able to
prevent Internet users from easily obtaining information about
W.E. Bailey & Son, Inc. The same argument can also be made for
Igloo Products Corporation which owns the mark "Playmate
Elite" 149 and many other owners of marks which include the words
"playboy" and "playmate."
Finally, the court also felt that members of the publio would
have their First Amendment rights violated because they would be
unable to use the words "playboy" or "playmate" to conduct

142 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1085.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.

146 Id.
147 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1085.
148 United States Patent & Trademark Office (last visited March 12, 2001)
< http://tess.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f-doc&state=qkonp3.3.2 >.
149 United States Patent & Trademark Office (last visited March 12, 2001)
2
< http://tess.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f-doc&state-qkonp3.5. >.
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searches on the Internet. 150
Essentially, the public's First
Amendment rights would be violated because a search using the
term "playboy" or "playmate" would only produce websites
owned by or affiliated with PEI.151 The public would be denied
the ability to use the terms "playboy" and "playmate"
to search for
52
PEI.1
with
affiliated
or
owned
other websites not

D. Likelihood of Confusion
In deciding the case, the court felt that Netscape's and Excite's
use of the words "playboy" and "playmate" did not merit the use
of the eight-factor test. 153 The eight-factor test is only applicable
when a defendant uses the plaintiffs mark in advertising. 154 The
court felt that Netscape and Excite did not use a trademark when
using "playboy" and "playmate.' 155
While PEI does use
"playboy" and "playmate" as trademarks, Netscape, Excite, and
Internet users use "playboy" and "playmate" as common English
words.15 6 The court also stated that Netscape and Excite did not
use "playboy" or "playmate" to identify goods or services or to
confuse customers. 157 Furthermore, the banner ads did not use any
of PEI's marks or confuse customers into believing
that the
1' 58
PEI.
by
endorsed
or
sponsored
were
advertisements
While the court clearly expressed its belief that the case did not
deserve use of the eight-factor likelihood of confusion test, the
court still used part of the test to illustrate that Netscape's and
Excite's use of the words "playboy" and "playmate" was not an
infringing use. 159 In applying the eight-factor test, the court stated
150 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1085.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1085.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.at 1086.
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that six of the eight factors were not applicable to the facts of the
case. 160 The first factor (strength of mark) and the third factor
(similarity of marks) were inapplicable because Netscape and
Excite did not use the words "playboy" or "playmate" as
trademarks. 16 1 The court also stated that the second factor
(proximity of goods), fifth factor (similarity of marketing
channels), sixth factor (degree of care used by the consumer), and
eighth factor (likelihood that plaintiff will expand their product
line) were inapplicable because Netscape and Excite did not
compete with PEI and because Netscape and Excite did not use the
words "playboy"
or "playmate" to identify any goods or
16 2
services.
Of the two factors that were applicable, actual confusion and
1 63
defendant's intent, both fell in favor of Netscape and Excite.
The fourth factor, actual confusion, fell in favor of Netscape and
Excite because PEI failed to present any evidence of actual
consumer confusion. 164 While actual confusion is not required to
lack of actual
find likelihood of confusion, the court stated that the 65
favor.1
Excite's
and
Netscape's
in
weighed
confusion
The court also found that the seventh factor, defendant's intent
to cause consumer confusion, favored Netscape and Excite.166 The
court decided in this manner because PEI failed to present any
evidence that Netscape and Excite had any intent to cause
confusion. 167 Furthermore, Netscape and Excite did not have an
incentive to cause confusion because they received payment for
result page, regardless if
every banner ad that appeared on a search
168
the user clicked on the banner ad or not.

160 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1085-1086.

161 Id. at 1086.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1086.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
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E. Dilution
The court also found that PEI's claim of trademark dilution
against Netscape and Excite was meritless. 169 PEI failed to present
evidence of a lessening of its mark's ability to identify and
distinguish its goods and services.1 70 In determining that no
dilution existed, the court recognized that dilution on the Internet
presented unique issues not usually found with traditional dilution
cases. 171
In deciding whether dilution has occurred, courts look to see if
the defendant's use of a trademark has either blurred or tarnished
the marks selling power. 172 Two elements are needed for a court
to find blurring. First, the defendant must use the plaintiffs mark
as its own mark to identify its goods or services. 173 Second, the
defendant's use of the mark must lessen the mark's ability to
identify and distinguish the plaintiff's product. 174 The court found
no dilution by blurring because neither Netscape nor Excite used
the words "playboy" and "playmate" to identify any of Netscape's
or Excite's goods or services. 175
The court also found no tarnishment. 176 Courts will find
tarnishment when a famous mark is incorrectly associated with an
inferior or offensive product. 177 PEI argued that its marks were
tarnished because they were placed near other adult entertainment
material even more explicit than its own.178 The court found this
argument to be weak. 179 The court recognized that all products
180
and services that PEI sells with its marks are sexually explicit.

169 Id. at 1088.
170 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1088.

171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1088.

at 1089.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1089.
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other sexually
Furthermore, PEI constantly sells its goods18near
1
bookstores.
adult
in
as
such
explicit materials

F. FairUse Doctrine
In its decision, the court stated that even if there was a
possibility of a likelihood of confusion, Netscape's and Excite's
use of the words "playboy" and "playmate" was protected by the
fair use doctrine. 18 Courts recognize the fair use defense when it
is established that the defendant was using the plaintiffs
trademark only to describe the plaintiff's goods or services.' 83 The
fair use defense prohibits the trademark holder from preventing
184
others from using words necessary to communicate ideas.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used the fair use doctrine in
New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc.185 In
New Kids, the defendant used the plaintiffs trademark "New Kids
on the Block" to identify the band in its newspaper and to conduct
a poll to determine the most popular band member.' 86 The court in
New Kids determined that the defendant's use of the plaintiffs
trademark was not infringement because it was used to describe
the plaintiff.187
The fair use defense has three elements. 88 The first is that the
plaintiffs product must be one that cannot be identified without
using the actual trademark. 189 For example, it is easier to refer to
the New York Yankees as the "New York Yankees" rather than,
"the really good baseball team from New York City which has
won 26 world championships." Second, the defendant may only
181 Id.
182 Id. at 1086.
183 New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302,

306 (9th Cir. 1992).
184 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1086.

185 New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 306.
at 304.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 308.
188 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1086.
189 Id.
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190
use so much of the plaintiffs mark as is reasonably necessary.
Third, the defendant cannot use the plaintiffs
mark in a manner
19 1
endorsement.
or
affiliation
suggest
may
that
In analyzing the fair use defense, the court decided that only two
of the three elements could be applied. 192 The court felt that the
first element could not be applied because it required actual use of
a trademark and here Netscape and Excite used the terms
"playboy" and "playmate" as common English words, not as
trademarks. 193 Nevertheless, the court did apply the second and
third elements in their analysis even though the terms "playboy"
and "playmate" were used in their common English capacity.
When applying the second element, the court recognized that
Netscape and Excite used the words "playboy" and "playmate" in
a limited manner. 195 The court noted that Netscape and Excite
only used the words "playboy" and "playmate" and did not use any
stylized letters or PEI's bunny logo.196 In applying the third
element, the court found that Netscape's and Excite's use of the
97
words did not suggest affiliation or endorsement. 1
To support its finding, the court referred to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals' language in Brookfield.19 8 In Brookefield, the
court stated that a defendant may use an English word in a metatag even if it is substantially similar to the plaintiff's trademark. 199

190 Id.

191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1086.

194 Id. All three elements of the fair use doctrine require that the defendant
be using a valid trademark. The court explained that it did not apply the first
element because Netscape and Excite were not using "playboy" or "playmate"
in their trademark capacities. Nevertheless, the court did apply the second and
third elements of the fair use doctrine without fully explaining why it chose to

analyze the second and third elements but not the first element.
195 Id. at 1087.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1087.

199 Id. See Brookefield 174 F.3d at 1066. The court in Brookefield decided
that West Coast (defendant) committed trademark infringement when it used

Brookefield's (plaintiff) mark "MovieBuff" in its domain name and in its metatags. Nevertheless, the court stated that West Coast could use the term "Movie
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Therefore, the court determined that because Netscape and Excite
used the words "playboy" and "playmate" as English words in its
adult entertainment package and because they did not use the
words in a stylized manner or suggest PEI's endorsement,
and Excite's use was protected by the fair use
Netscape's
200
doctrine.

G. PreliminaryInjunction
To obtain a preliminary injunction in the Ninth Circuit, the
plaintiff must either show a combination of probable success on
the merits and possible irreparable harm or a serious question
concerning the merits of the case and hardships weighing heavily
against the plaintiff.20 1 Recently, the courts have become reluctant
to approve preliminary injunctions and have even denied
20 2
injunctions in cases where confusion seemed more than likely.
In analyzing the facts of the case, the court determined that PEI
failed to establish either of the requirements and denied PEI's
motion for a preliminary injunction. 20 3 The court based it refusal
of the preliminary injunction on two factors. First, the court
determined that PEI failed to establish a likelihood of confusion or
dilution and therefore failed to show that PEI would suffer
irreparable harm.204 The court also took into consideration the fact
that PEI delayed its motion for preliminary injunction and
demonstrated that PEI was not
reasoned that such delay further
20 5
experiencing irreparable harm.
Buff' on its website because it was a common term, but could not use the term
"moviebuff' because the term without a space was not commonly used. The
court also stated that West Coast was not completely barred from using
"MovieBuff' because West Coast could use it to describe Brookefield's goods
and services.
200 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1087.
201 Id. at 1073.
202 Kera, supra note 53, at 115.
203 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1089.
204 Id. at 1090.
205 Id.
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The court also considered the injunction to be "inherently
flawed. 20 6 The inherent flaw of the proposed injunction was that
it would either enjoin nothing or enjoin too much.20 7 The
injunction would bar nothing because an Internet user cannot enter
the trademarks "Playboy®" or "Playmate®" as search terms since
only words in their common form can be entered as search
terms. 20 8 The court also feared that an injunction would bar too
much because it would bar all advertising uses of the words
"playboy" and "playmate" as search terms even though PEI does
not own a monopoly over the words.20 9

V. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The court's decision in Playboy v. Netscape was a major step in
determining the applicability of trademark law to advertising on
the Internet. Whereas past cases have begun to set precedent on
how trademark infringement and dilution will be determined
concerning trademark use in domain names, website text, and
meta-tags, this case was the first to determine how trademark
infringement and dilution will be determined when trademarks are
used to trigger banner ads.
The Playboy v. Netscape decision is important because the use
of banner ads has greatly increased. More search engines have
begun using the Internet user's search terms to trigger banner ads.
Therefore, it is very likely that more cases will develop concerning
the use of trademarks as triggering mechanisms for banner ads.
The importance of the decision in Playboy v. Netscape lies in the
fact that it is the first step in determining what constitutes
trademark infringement and dilution when words and trademarks
are used to trigger banner ads.
The court's decision in Playboy v. Netscape to refuse the
injunction motion was correct and properly reasoned in light of the
206
207
208
209

Id.
Id.
Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1090.
Id.
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facts of the case. In many respects however, the ruling by the
court is too narrow. It is narrow because the court could have
claimed that even when uncommon English word marks are used
to trigger banner ads, the use is not trademark infringement or
dilution. The court could have determined that even when an
uncommon word mark is used to trigger banner ads, there is no
likelihood of confusion or dilution because the actual mark is not
appearing on the ad that appears. It is unlikely that an Internet
user would confuse the owner of the banner ad with the owner of
the trademark used for the search because there is no visual
connection between the trademark and the banner ad.
The crux of the court's analysis was that "playboy" and
"playmate" were common English words which cannot be barred
from use. While this analysis is correct and supported by past
cases, 210 it is not the only argument that the court could have made
in its opinion. The court could have extended its analysis and
considered whether the use of trademarks, without common
English words, is trademark infringement. It is possible that the
court could have come to the same conclusion when examining the
use of actual trademarks rather than common English words.
The use of a trademark as a key search term to trigger banner
ads may not constitute trademark infringement or dilution because
when a banner ad appears on a search result page, the trademark
being used does not appear in the banner ad. The search engine
user does not relate the search term (trademark) used with the
banner ad that appears on the page. Unlike the use of trademarks
in domain names and meta-tags which lead to initial interest
confusion, the possibility of confusion with banner ads is minimal.
Finding initial interest confusion is correct when trademarks are
used in domain names and meta-tags because the search engine
user is brought directly to a list of websites that include the
trademark the user entered. With banner ads however, the search
engine user will never see the trademark in the banner ad and
therefore not relate the trademark with the owner of the banner ad.
More than likely, a court applying the Sleekcraft Factors in such a
210 See Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174
F.3d 1036 (9th Cir 1999).
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case would find that there is no likelihood of confusion and
therefore no trademark infringement.
The court in Playboy v. Netscape could have explored this
possibility but decided not to for its own reasons. A case may
soon develop where a search engine operator has used a trademark
that is not a common English word as a key search term to trigger
banner ads. When that day comes, it will be interesting to see how
the court will analyze the case and to see how much of the court's
analysis stems from the decision made in Playboy v. Netscape.
More than likely, the next court which analyzes this issue will
extend the decision made in Playboy v. Netscape so that owners of
search engines will also be allowed to use uncommon English
word trademarks to trigger banner ads. Nevertheless, the court's
decision in Playboy v. Netscape was well reasoned and accurate in
applying trademark law to the facts. The court's analysis was well
supported, and its decision to deny a preliminary injunction was
correct.

A. Use of the Marks "Playboy" and "Playmate"
in Commerce
The court correctly determined that Netscape's and Excite's use
of the words "playboy" and "playmate" as key search terms in
their 450-word adult entertainment package was not trademark
infringement. The court properly recognized that Netscape and
Excite were triggering banner ads whenever a search engine user
entered the words "playboy" and "playmate" not the marks
"Playboy®" and "Playmate®." The court also recognized that
neither Netscape nor Excite used PEI's marks in their trademark
form of "Playboy®" or "Playmate®" and that search engine users
would be unable to enter "Playboy®" or "Playmate®" as search
words. The opinion by the court correctly expressed that PEI was
unable to prove that Netscape and Excite were using the words
"playboy" and "playmate" as trademark terms rather than just
common English words.
In reaching its decision, the court cited two Internet trademark
cases and followed the precedent established by these cases. In
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Brookefield, the court ruled that West Coast's use of the term
"moviebuff' in its meta-tags and in www.moviebuff.com was
trademark infringement because it would cause initial interest
confusion. 211 The court, however, did state that West Coast could
use the term "movie buff' (with a space between the words) in its
website because it is a descriptive term used to describe avid
motion picture fans. 212 The facts in Playboy v. Netscape were
similar. In Playboy v. Netscape, Netscape and Excite were using
the common English words "playboy" and "playmate" as key
The court followed the
search terms in their search engines.
reasoning established in Brookefield that common terms could not
be barred and correctly refused to restrain Netscape and Excite
from using the words "playboy" and "playmate. ' ' 213 0
The court's decision is also comparable to the decision made in
Playboy v. Welles. In Playboy v. Welles, the court determined that
Welles' use of several PEI trademarks in her website was not
trademark infringement because she used the words "playboy" and
"playmate" as descriptive terms, not as trademarks. 2 4 Similarly,
in Playboy v. Netscape, Netscape and Excite used the words
"playboy" and "playmate" as common descriptive English words
rather than as trademarks. Once again, the court recognized that
Netscape and Excite were using "playboy" and "playmate" as
common words and followed the court in Playboy v. Welles and
refused to grant the injunction.

B. Limited PropertyRights to the Words "Playboy" and
"Playmate"
The court clearly recognized that PEI was trying to obtain a
monopoly over the words "playboy" and "playmate." Following
precedent, the court denied PEI's claim that Netscape and Excite
violated PEI's trademark rights when they used the words
211 Brookefield, 174 F.3d at 1062.
212 Id. at 1066.
213 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1082.
214 Playboy v. Welles, 78 F. Supp.2d at 1078.
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"playboy" and "playmate." The court followed previous Ninth
Circuit decisions that stated that a trademark owner cannot
monopolize the use of words in
its trademark 15 and cannot bar all
216
uses of a word on the Internet.
The court's decision is correct because it was clear that Netscape
and Excite were only using the words "playboy" and "playmate"
as general common terms, not as trademarks. The use of the
words must be protected because no party has the right to bar the
use of a common English word. Therefore, Playboy does not have
the right to stop any party from using the words "playboy" and
"playmate."
In reaching its decision, the court again compared the case to
Playboy v. Welles. As mentioned before, in Playboy v. Welles the
court allowed several of Playboy's marks to be used in Welles'
website because the marks were being used as descriptive words
rather than trademarks. In Playboy v. Netscape, the court made the
same reasoning and correctly claimed that Netscape and Excite
were using "playboy" and 21"playmate"
as descriptive English
7
trademarks.
than
rather
words

C. The FirstAmendment's Protectionof the Use of the
Words "'Playboy"and "'Playmate"
In finding no trademark infringement, the court correctly ruled
that Netscape and Excite were protected by the First Amendment.
Once again, PEI was unable to prove that Netscape and Excite
were using "playboy" and "playmate" in a trademark manner. The
215 See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 306. (Stating that the
defendant's use of the mark "New Kids on the Block" to identify the band in its
newspaper and to conduct a popularity poll was not trademark infringement.
The court stated that the mark was used in a descriptive manner and that a
trademark owner could not prevent others from using a mark in a descriptive
manner.)
216 See Brookefield, 174 F.3d at 1066. (Stating that the defendant could use
the plaintiffs mark "movie buff' (with a space between the words) when it is
used as a descriptive term to describe an avid motion picture fan.)
217 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1082.
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court recognized this and therefore was able to state that
Netscape's and Excite's use of the words was protected by the
First Amendment. The court ruled in this manner because it
wanted to prevent PEI from obtaining a monopoly over the words
"playboy" and "playmate." The court was correct in making this
analysis because granting PEI trademark protection in this case
would affect other parties who may want to use the words
"playboy" and "playmate." The two terms are clearly English
words, words which receive First Amendment protection when
properly used.
The court's decision is similar to the decision in Bally. Just as in
Bally where the defendant's use of the term "Bally Sucks" in a
website was protected because it was used in free speech criticism,
the court in Playboy v. Netscape protected Netscape's and Excite's
use of "playboy" and "playmate" because they were used as
English words, not trademarks. 218 The court determined that since
Netscape and Excite are not using "playboy" and "playmate" as
Amendment right to use the words as
trademarks, they have a2First
19
mechanisms.
triggering

D. No Likelihood of Confusion
In applying two of the eight "Sleekcraft Factors," the court
correctly found that no likelihood of confusion existed. The court
only used the actual confusion and intent to cause confusion
factors because all other six factors were inapplicable. The court
properly excluded six factors because they required a defendant to
be using the plaintiff's trademark. Since Netscape and Excite were
not using PEI's marks, the six factors could not be applied.
PEI failed to present any evidence of existing confusion between
its marks and Netscape's and Excite's use of the words "playboy"
and "playmate" and was therefore properly denied in its claim of
actual confusion. PEI also failed to present any evidence showing
Netscape and Excite had used the words "playboy" and
218 Bally, 29 F. Supp.2d at 1167.
219 Playboy, 55 F. Supp.2d at 1084-1085.
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"playmate" to purposely confuse customers. This failure properly
led the court to determine that Netscape and Excite had no intent
to cause consumer confusion.

E. No TrademarkDilution
The court accurately determined that Netscape's and Excite's
use of the words "playboy" and "playmate" did not blur or tarnish
PEI's marks and therefore neither Netscape or Excite committed
trademark dilution. Trademark dilution in the Ninth Circuit
requires proof of actual dilution and the court correctly ruled that
PEI failed to present such proof. PEI was unable to show blurring
because there were no instances where Netscape and Excite used
the marks "Playboy" or "Playmate" to describe or identify either
Netscape's or Excite's products or services.
Properly, the court also did not find tarnishment. As a company
who specializes in adult entertainment, PEI is in a business which
many people deem distasteful. PEI's argument that the adult
entertainment banner ads triggered by the words "playboy" and
"playmate" tarnishes its marks is therefore weak. The court found
that PEI sells sexually explicit material and that PEI informs its
PEI also sells its
readers how to find sexually explicit material.2
sexually explicit material near other sexually explicit material,
many times in adult bookstores. 221 Consequently, the court
correctly found PEI's argument of trademark dilution as
unpersuasive because the plaintiff and the defendant sold similar
material in similar places.222 The court's analysis is correct
because while some adult entertainment may be more distasteful
then others, it is quite difficult to claim that a more distasteful
product is tarnishing a product that many already view as
distasteful.

220 Id. at 1089.
221 Id.
222 Id.
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F. The FairUse Doctrine'sProtection of Netscape's and
Excite's Use of the Words "Playboy" and "Playmate"
The court correctly stated that even if Netscape's and Excite's
use of "playboy" and "playmate" created a likelihood of
confusion, their use would have been protected by the fair use
doctrine. The court applied only two of the three elements used to
determine if the fair use defense is applicable. The court was
correct in determining that Netscape and Excite only used
"playboy" and "playmate" in a limited manner as required by the
fair use doctrine. This reasoning was accurate because Netscape
and Excite only used the words in their most basic form. Netscape
and Excite did not include any stylized letters or PEI's bunny logo.
The court also stated that Netscape's and Excite's use of
"playboy" and "playmate" did not suggest affiliation with or
endorsement by PEI. This analysis was also correct because
Netscape and Excite used the words as hidden key search terms in
their search engines. Search engine users could not wrongfully
believe that Netscape and Excite were affiliated with or endorsed
by PEI because banner ads triggered by the words "playboy" and
"playmate" did not include the actual words in the ads.
Similar to the court's decision in Brookefield where the court
stated that the use of a common English word in a meta-tag is
allowed even if the word is similar to a trademark, the court in
Playboy v. Netscape claimed that Netscape and Excite could
include the common words "playboy" and "playmate" in its 450word adult entertainment package.22 3 In making this comparison,
the court accurately determined that Netscape and Excite were
only including common words in their adult entertainment
package; words that many search engine users would use when
looking for adult entertainment websites.

223 Brookefield, 174 F.3d at 1066.
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G. The Denialof PEI's Requestfor a PreliminaryInjunction
The court's decision to refuse PEI's motion request was
appropriate because PEI failed to present strong evidence to
support its case. The court accurately picked apart PEI's
arguments and determined that PEI did not establish probable
success. PEI's failure to show either a likelihood of confusion or
actual dilution left its case extremely weak and also damaged
PEI's argument that there was possible irreparable harm. The
court also took into consideration PEI's delay in filing for the
preliminary injunction motion. Correctly, the court used this
information to determine that PEI was not experiencing, or in
danger of experiencing, irreparable harm.

VI. IMPACT
In many respects, the court's decision in Playboy v. Netscape
fails to answer the main issue of the case; whether trademarks can
be used by non-owners to trigger banner ads on the Internet. By
claiming that "Playboy" and "Playmate" were not used as
trademark terms, the court skirts the issue and does not establish
precedent for future courts to follow. The court's decision does,
however, permit non-owners of a trademark to use the mark as a
key search term to trigger banner ads as long as the mark is also a
common English word. The decision, however, does not establish
whether a trademark can be used as a key search term to trigger
banner ads when the mark fails to include common English words.
By not deciding the issue of trademark use in banner
advertising, the court leaves the door wide open concerning the use
of trademarks as triggering mechanisms. It is left for another court
to determine whether the use of a trademark to trigger banner ads
is truly trademark infringement and dilution. While no such case
has yet to develop since the decision in Playboy v. Netscape, it is
very likely that one will develop soon. In fact, it may even be up
to the legislators to decide how such a problem will be handled. If
the courts are unable to apply existing trademark law to banner
advertising on the Internet, legislators may have to step in and
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create law to settle the issue. Legislators have already stepped into
the arena of trademark law and the Internet with the creation of the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.224 It is very possible
that legislators may feel obligated to step in again and settle the
issue of trademark use in banner advertising.
While the court's decision in Playboy v. Netscape did not settle
the issue of trademark use in triggering banner ads, it did succeed
in re-affirming the limited rights trademark holders have in
protecting their marks. The decision established that trademarks
owners do not hold a complete monopoly over the marks they
own. It also established that non-owner users of trademarks can
use the fair use doctrine and the First Amendment as viable
defenses as long as the party uses the mark in a descriptive
manner. Finally, the decision established that trademark law, with
minor modifications and adjustments, is still applicable to the
highly technological area of the Internet. The question that still
remains, however, is whether existing trademark law can be
successfully applied to the use of non-English word trademarks
triggering banner ads.

VII. CONCLUSION
The court in Playboy v. Netscape was correct in refusing PEI's
motion for Preliminary Injunction. I disagree however, in the
manner in which the court came to its conclusion. The court
hinged its decision on the facts that Netscape and Excite were
using "playboy" and "playmate" as common English words rather
than trademarks. While this analysis is accurately supported by
the court and analytically correct, I feel that it was the easier and
less controversial of two possible decisions that the court could
have made. Instead, the court could have found that all uses of
trademarks to trigger banner ads, not just the use of common
English word trademarks, is not infringement or dilution. Such a
decision would have been controversial because it would have
granted Internet search engines the right to use all non-design
224 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1999).
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trademarks as trigger mechanisms for their banner ads. More than
likely, such a decision would have caused a chaotic reaction in all
companies who own and cherish the private use of their
trademarks.
Although controversial, such a decision would have been
correct. Using trademarks to trigger banner ads does not create a
likelihood of confusion because the search engine user does not
associate the banner ad with the listing of websites that was
generated by the use of the trademark as a search term. As long as
the trademark does not appear in the banner ad, the user will not be
confused to the point where they believe that the company
advertising on the banner is associated with the trademark they just
used as a search term. The court could have decided in such a
manner but decided not to. Therefore, the court failed to seize its
opportunity to make a possible landmark decision in trademark
law and left the door wide open for another court to determine
whether the use of trademarks to trigger banner ads is trademark
infringement and dilution.
PatrickJ Mackey
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